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Reasonable Expectations: Seeking A
Principled Application
WILLIAM A. MAYHEW*
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance contracts, the written policies of insurance, are, in the
vast majority of cases,' clearly contracts of adhesion. 2 Adhesion con-
tracts in both insurance and non-insurance cases have long vexed
courts attempting to apply the traditional rules of contract law,
which are classically based on the theory of freedom of contract with
the terms of the agreement bargained for between the parties,3 to the
realities of the adhesion contract where virtually all of the terms of
the contract are dictated and determined solely by one side. That is,
the basic terms of the form contract are offered to one party on a
strict take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In order to deal with the problems inherent in adhesion contracts
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the valuable research assistance of Gerald Jeutter, J.D., 1985, Mississippi
College School of Law.
1. It has been estimated that 99% of all contracts are on standard forms. Slaw-
son, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
2. Adhesion contracts in insurance mean that the insured receives a standard in-
surance policy without any ability to negotiate the terms. Where the terms are negoti-
ated or could be negotiated, the insurance contract, though contained in a standard
policy, is not truly a contract of adhesion. See Holmes, A Contextual Study of Com-
mercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Co ntract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV.
381 (1978), where the author points out that insurance contracts are adhesive for the
following reasons: "the inequality of bargaining power and knowledge as between in-
surer and applicant, the technical character of the insurance contract, the fact that de-
livery of the policy often occurs after contract formation and premium payment, and
the mass-standardized nature of insurance contracts." Id. at 397 (footnotes omitted).
See also Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784
(1961). Cf Ponder v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 145 Cal. App. 3d 709, 719, 193 Cal. Rptr.
632, 637 (1983) (inability of insured to negotiate individual terms rendered insurance
contract a contract of adhesion).
3. Holmes points out that insurance law never came within the classical law of
contract. Holmes, supra note 2, at 393-95.
the courts have often turned to covert decisional methods that may
go far beyond our concepts of fairness and reasonableness in protect-
ing the interests of the drafting party. The courts have employed,
perhaps the word should be misemployed, contractual rules of inter-
pretation4 or have applied some other doctrine such as estoppel,
waiver, 5 public policy6 or unconscionability7 (where the decisions
often turn on the status of the parties).8 Neither the Restatement
(Second)9 nor the Uniform Commercial Codelo provide any other
workable, and at the same time, predictable solution.
It is not surprising to find the courts resorting to covert reasoning
where the inquiry into the problems caused by adhesion contracts is
narrowed solely to insurance disputes. In order to reach a desired re-
sult while applying classical contract rules the courts have often en-
gaged in reasoning which is no more than makeweight. In fact, the
real basis for the court's opinion in many insurance cases is neither in
the opinion 1' nor does it appear beyond a slight reference.12
4. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702-703 (1939) (reviewing 0.
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CON-
TINENTAL LAW (1937)); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943).
5. For a general discussion of estoppel and waiver in insurance law, see 16 B. AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9081-9090 (1981). See also Morris, Waiver
and Estoppel in Insurance Litigation, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1957).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 427 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1983), where
a husband and wife were seeking to recover maternity benefits under a group medical
policy. The employer terminated the Blue Cross policy on February 1, 1976, and
purchased another group medical policy for his employees that did not provide mater-
nity benefits. The baby was born on July 13, 1976, while the successor policy was in
force. The court justified coverage under the cancelled policy on the ground of unde-
fined public policy. Id. at 141. See also Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 702-03.
7. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
8. Professor Spiegel Leff, in discussing equitable unconscionability, stated:
Within the ambit of those factors of contract-procuring behavior which would
result in a denial of specific performance, a bewildering number of permuta-
tions work to inform the chancellor's discretion. In these cases one runs con-
tinually into the old, the young, the ignorant, the necessitous, the illiterate,
the improvident, the drunken, the naive and the sick, all on one side of the
transaction, with the sharp and hard on the other. Language of quasi-fraud
and quasi-duress abounds. Certain whole classes of presumptive sillies like
sailors and heirs and farmers and women continually wander on and off stage.
Those not certifiably crazy, but nonetheless pretty peculiar, are often to be
found. And in most of the cases, of course, several of these factors appear in
combination.
Id. at 531-33 (footnotes omitted).
9. See Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 782-84 (1981).
10. Leff, supra note 7, at 558-59; Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Uncon-
scionability: A New Framework for U..CC Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4
(1981).
11. See, e.g., Galinko v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 432 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (decision saves lawyer from malpractice).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 427 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1983).
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The use of covert methods by the courts to reach a desired decision
in insurance disputes is often the result of the courts' discomfort with
an express statement of the true basis for a decision. Courts often re-
sort to covert methods for a variety of reasons: emotion,'3 desire to
judicially regulate some aspect of the insurance industry,14 perceived
unfairness on the part of the insurer,15 or the desire to implement ju-
dicial theories of wealth-spreading or wealth-redistribution.16
Though the problems caused by this covert means of judicial deci-
sion-making have been recognized for many years,17 judges, with all
their human frailties, have continued to rely on such covert meth-
ods 18 to reach results the court considers satisfying while at the same
time avoiding the criticism that might well occur if the true reason-
ing of the decision were set forth. The obvious problem of this type
of judicial approach is that such covert-based opinions are mislead-
ing.19 Lawyers are trained to predict results based on past decisions.
Lawyers are also trained to react to judicial decisions in a lawyer-like
manner; thus, lawyers may rewrite contracts such as insurance poli-
cies to correct infirmities that the lawyer believes to be created by a
particular decision. Where the perceived infirmity does not represent
the true rationale, additional litigation: may well result in not only
additional appellate opinions but opinions that continue to base their
decisions on covert methods. As a result, there is a marked diminu-
tion in the reliance that can be placed on that court's opinions in in-
13. See, e.g., id.
14. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 CaL 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967) (regulation of claims practices by imposing bad faith liability on insurance
companies).
15. See, e.g., Countryside Casualty Co. v. Grant, 269 Ark. 526, 601 S.W.2d 875 (1980)
(clear exclusion provision in an insurance contract became ambiguous when consid-
ered in relation to the purpose and circumstances surrounding the making of the con-
tract, thereby providing coverage to the insured).;
16. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 627 P.2d 317 (1981) (the
real reason for giving the insured apparently unlimited oral insurance appears to be
that the individual defendant, a chef and entrepreneur, spoke English so poorly that
communication with him was difficult).
17. See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 702-03.
18. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 11-16.
19. See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 703. See also Holmes, supra note 2, at 398,
where the author states:
Contract and insurance law have had to pay a high price in terms of uncer-
tainty because of the felt duty to reconcile a fair result with freedom of con-
tract, to maintain an artificial unity in contract law, and not to strip insurer's
shields (albeit technical ones) against dishonest insureds, sentimental jurors
and fickle judges. One result has been unnecessary litigation, because lawyers
are encouraged to assert technical but irrelevant theories.
Id. at 398.
surance disputes. There is additional disruption since this lack of
predictability affects not only insurance companies but also insurance
consumers. There are additional economic costs that will have to be
passed on to the insurance consumer in higher policy costs plus the
higher economic costs to society in general for uncompensated litiga-
tion costs incurred by government. 20
The fact that insurance contracts are adhesive does not, by itself,
make such contracts bad. In fact, the use of preprinted forms by the
insurance industry is an absolute necessity.2 ' The use of the form in-
surance policy allows for the standardization of risks and the resul-
tant computation of premiums. Without the standardized contract of
insurance, the attorneys fees and underwriting fees would render in-
surance impractical for probably most of the consumer market.
Clearly, without standardization the costs of selling the policy, under-
writing the risk and drafting the insurance contract would far exceed
the actual costs of the risk-spreading element of the transaction.22
Insurance contracts may be more adhesive than most other com-
mercial contracts since the insured generally has no power to alter
the policy and often the insured will order insurance without reading
or even being given the opportunity to read the actual policy terms.
In the non-insurance situation, the terms of the adhesion agreement
usually are contained somewhere in the document to be executed,
though sometimes these terms are incorporated from the back of a
form contract.
At the center of much of this judicial desire to employ unstated de-
cisional reasons has been the marketing process by which insurance
policies are sold. An additional factor is the courts' inability to fash-
ion substantive law in the insurance area in a way that accurately re-
flects the true state of insurance marketing and insurance contract
formation.23 Policies of insurance are usually sold through insurance
20. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 398-99. Numerous insurance opinions have chas-
tised insurance companies for the cumbersome and technical language used in policies.
A number of insurers have simplified their policy language only to find the simplifica-
tion penalized by the courts. See generally Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art
of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985); Note, Au-
topsy of a Plain English Insurance Contract: Can Plain English Survive Proximate
Cause? - Graham v. Public Employees Mutual Insurance Co., 59 WASH. L. REV. 565
(1984). See also Farnham, The Untimely Demise of Policy Defenses - New Property
Policies and the I.S.O., 14 FORUM 177 (1977). For a recent and very good example, see
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 38
Cal. 3d 425, 696 P.2d 1308, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1985).
21. See Rotkin, Standard Forms: Legal Doctrine in Search of an Appropriate
Body of Law, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 599, 600 (1977); Kessler, supra note 4, at 631-32.
22. See Slawson, supra note 1, at 530-31.
23. Cf. Young, Lewis & Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends,
625 INs. L.J. 71 (1975), where the authors state:
Decisions like these, while they may serve the judiciary's notion of justice
and fair play, simply add to the confusion which already exists. Drafters are
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agents. The so-called agent may in reality be a direct employee of
the insurer, an agent who represents only that insurer, or an in-
dependent insurance broker who may represent any number of in-
surers. The prospective insured and the agent may reach agreement
concerning only what is to be insured, the name or names to be listed
as the named insured or named insureds, the insurance company on
the risk, a general description of the insurance coverage, the dollar
limits of the coverage and the premium cost. This may be done
orally and is often done by telephone. The insured usually will not
see the whole written contract, the insurance policy, with its detailed
and specific provisions, many of which are cumbersome and heavy
reading, until the policy is received by mail or delivered by the agent.
In any event, there is usually a delay between the time the insured
agrees to purchase the policy and the time the insured receives the
actual policy, which contains terms dictated entirely by the insurer.2 4
The insurance contract does differ substantially from other adhe-
invited to attempt new and probably more complex wording. Plaintiff's attor-
neys are encouraged to engage in further semantical hair-splitting to find am-
biguities in unfavorable provisions. Furthermore, it is submitted, the labeling
or non-labeling of the contract as one of "adhesion" is likely to have little in-
fluence upon the construction chosen by a court; in either event, words will
purportedly be given their plain and usual meanings, and unclear or ambigu-
ous words will be construed more strongly in favor of the insured. Perhaps
the significance of the employment of the term "adhesion contract" is that
certain associated "well-established" rules of construction are thereby raised,
which rules grant to the courts greater latitude in detecting and protecting
policyholders from unclear provisions. Possibly the use of the term can accu-
rately be seen as no more than a symptom that a court is searching more dili-
gently for an ambiguity. Some of the decisions, though, suggest that the
judges, in insurance litigation, have assumed a discretion which goes beyond
merely construing ambiguities, and a number of commentators have agreed
that such an approach ought to be openly employed.
The courts have been urged to recognize the true nature of adhesion con-
tracts and to adopt a multiple system of contract law wherein the meaning of
freedom of contract ". . . must change with the social importance of the type
of contract and with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the
standardized contract." If the judiciary is to renounce the law of contracts as
a basis for resolving insurance disputes, however, one must ask what guide-
lines are to be utilized in the formulation of decisions other than the court's
unfettered notion of what is just in a given situation. Perhaps one answer
would be the judicial adoption of a doctrine similar to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's "unconscionability" provision, whereby a judge is empowered to
refuse to enforce a contract for the sale of goods or any part of such a contract
upon a finding that the contract is unconscionable. Unconscionability has
been found to exist where a party of superior bargaining strength used that
strength to impose harsh or unfair provisions upon the weaker party, and, in-
deed, some courts have extended the doctrine to contracts which were not
under the legislative purview of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 77 (footnotes omitted).
24. See Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expecta-
sive non-insurance contracts. By industry practice an insurance pol-
icy can usually be cancelled prior to its expiration date without the
insured incurring untoward expenses or legal consequences. This
right of cancellation on the part of the insured is a sufficient basis by
itself for the courts to enforce against the insured a legal duty to read
the policy,25 notwithstanding the fact that most insureds simply will
not take the time and make the effort.26
The courts have responded to this scheme of insurance contract
formation in a number of ways. Several judicial tools are used by
courts to covertly decide insurance cases and camouflage true reasons
for the decision. These include misapplying the concepts of estoppel
and waiver, 27 stretching to find ambiguities beyond a reasonable in-
terpretation of the policy language 28 and applying vague expressions
of public policy.29
As a result of the many problems caused by the perceived harsh-
ness of certain insurance policy provisions and the courts' desire to
regulate,30 the doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved. The
purpose of this article is to trace the history of the doctrine, to ana-
lyze its recent applications by the courts, and to explore the issue of
whether the doctrine is being used as a covert tool. Lastly this article
will suggest modifications in the application of the doctrine.
tions in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1180-81
(1982).
25. See, e.g., Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 810, 640 P.2d 764, 769, 180
Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1982); Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925,
928 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982). Cf. Croteau v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 123 N.H.
317, 320, 461 A.2d 111, 113-14 (1983) (duty to read may be obviated if policy construc-
tion would dissuade a reasonable person).
26. See R. KEETON, BAsIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 351 (1971).
27. See supra note 5.
28. See supra note 4.
29. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966) (language of policy led insured to expect defense of third party suit); See also
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961, 969-72 (1970).
30. Cf Keeton, supra note 29, at 966-67:
Insurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion, under which the
insured is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions of-
fered to him, even when the standard forms are prescribed by public officials
rather than insurers. Moreover, although statutory and administrative regula-
tions have made increasing inroads on the insurer's autonomy by prescribing
some kinds of provisions and proscribing others, most insurance policy provi-
sions are still drafted by insurers. Regulation is relatively weak in most in-
stances, and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or
administrative action ordinarily are in essence adoptions, outright or slightly
modified, of proposals made by insurers' draftsmen.
Under such circumstances as these, judicial regulation of contracts of adhe-
sion, whether concerning insurance or some other kind of transaction, re-
mains appropriate.
Id. at 966-67 (footnote omitted).
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II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE
The doctrine of reasonable expectations seems to have first devel-
oped as an interpretive tool used to resolve ambiguities in the insur-
ance context. In Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,31 Judge Learned Hand used the doctrine as an interpretive tool
and rejected a literal reading of the policy without expressly finding
the provision in question ambiguous.32 In Gaunt, the decedent signed
an application for life insurance and gave the agent the full first pre-
mium. Both the application signed by the decedent and the receipt
given the decedent by the agent provided that the policy would not
be in force until approved by the insurer's home office though, once
approved, the effective date of the policy would relate back to the
successful completion of the required medical examination.33
Gaunt was examined twice and the insurer's home office medical
staff medically approved the application. On the same day the home
office approved and forwarded the application for final acceptance,
Gaunt died and the application never received final approval.34 In
ruling in favor of the beneficiaries of the policy and rejecting a literal
reading of the application and the receipt, Judge Hand stated:
[T]he ordinary applicant who has paid his first premium and has successfully
passed his physical examination, would not 'by the remotest chance under-
stand the clause as leaving him uncovered until the insurer at its leisure ap-
proved the risk; he would assume that he was getting immediate coverage for
his money.35
The seminal case in the evolution of the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations in insurance law is Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insur-
ance Co.36 Kievit involved the purchase of an accident insurance
policy. The issued policy was entitled "Form 92 - Time Accident
Policy" and stated that the policy "Provides Indemnity for Loss of
Time by Accidental Bodily lnjuries, and for Loss of Life, Limb or
Sight by Accidental Means to the Extent Herein Provided." 37 The
policy went on to provide the plaintiff with monthly payments
"against loss resulting directly and independently of all other causes
31. 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). The courts have long
spoken of reasonable expectations in interpreting insurance contracts. See, e.g., Bird v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
32. 160 F.2d at 601-02.
33. The trial judge found that both the decedent and the agent intended coverage
from the date of completion of the medical examination. Id. at 600.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 602.
36. 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
37. Id, at 477, 170 A.2d at 24.
from accidental bodily injuries .... ,"38 In addition the policy ex-
cluded "disability or other loss resulting from or contributed to by
any disease or ailment."39 While the policy was in force, the plaintiff
was struck in the head by a board and became totally disabled.
At trial medical testimony indicated that plaintiff had either suf-
fered from a psychiatric condition known as conversion hysteria
caused by his head injury or that he suffered from pre-existing Par-
kinson's disease.40 The trial judge applied the wording of the policy
literally and found that the plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing dis-
ease that precluded recovery under the policy.41
The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to base the Kievit decision
on the presence or absence of an express clause denying benefits for
loss caused or contributed to by either some disease or ailment, as
had the lower appellate court.42 To have done so would have re-
sulted in a finding for the insurer since the policy contained such an
exclusionary clause. Nor did the supreme court attempt to find or
create some ambiguity in the policy in order to interpret the policy in
favor of the insured. Rather, the court, in spite of the literal terms of
the policy, based its decision as follows:
[T]he court's goal in construing an accident insurance policy is to effectuate
the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who buys it;
he may hardly be expected to draw any subtle or legalistic distinctions based
on the presence or absence of the exclusionary clause for he pays premiums in
the strong belief that if he sustains accidental injury which results (in the
commonly accepted sense) in his disability he will be indemnified and not left
empty-handed on the company's assertion that his disability was caused or
contributed to by a latent disease or condition of which he was unaware and
which did not affect him before the accident.4 3
The underlying basis for the decision in Kievit seems to be the
court's recognition that Mr. Kievit was forty-eight years old when he
purchased the policy and that to enforce the policy literally would re-
sult in insurance of little or no practical benefit due to the natural
aging process of the human body. The court was also undoubtedly
concerned with the financial impact on often destitute insureds in
fighting denials of coverage by insurers, in light of the fact that
Kievit was decided prior to the advent of the bad faith doctrine.
Two cases dealing with airline trip insurance policies, which both
involved the same defendant insurer, are also of importance. The
first is Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,44 where the decedent
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 479-80, 170 A.2d at 24-25.
41. Id. at 481, 170 A.2d at 25-26.
42. Id. at 488, 170 A.2d at 30 (citing Mahon v. American Casualty Co., 65 N.J.
Super. 148, 167 A.2d 191 (1961)).
43. Kievit, 34 N.J. at 488-89, 170 A.2d at 30.
44. 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
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purchased a policy of airline trip insurance from a vending machine
placed in front of a non-scheduled airline counter from which the de-
cedent then purchased a ticket after procuring the insurance. The
policy specifically covered only flights on a "Civilian Scheduled
Airline."45
The court's decision in Lachs that the insured was covered was not
based on the ambiguity raised by the words "Civilian Scheduled Air-
line" in the policy. The real basis for the decision appears to be that
the location of the vending machine was misleading to passengers on
the non-scheduled flights. The insurer failed to give adequate notice
of non-coverage not only to Lachs, but also to other non-scheduled
airline passengers who had purchased insurance. The court held that
Lachs was covered even though the literal terms of the policy did not
provide passengers with coverage.46 Though the court in Lachs did
not base its decision on a theory of honoring the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured by overriding the express terms of the policy (a
theory which had not yet been clearly enunciated),4 7 it is clear that
the theory would have been applicable based on the misleading activ-
ity of the insurer.
The second case is Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.48 The dece-
dent, Steven, purchased an airplane trip insurance policy. The policy
set out in bold type the following words: "NOR FOR TRAVEL ON
OTHER THAN SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS."49 The machine
also provided an envelope for the mailing of the policy to his benefi-
ciary. Using this envelope, Steven mailed the policy to his wife.5 0
Though Steven had purchased a round-trip airline ticket on a sched-
uled airline, his return flight was delayed. A substitute flight on a
charter aircraft was arranged. The charter crashed.51
The court found coverage partially because the decedent, by
purchasing trip insurance, had a reasonable expectation that coverage
would extend even to substitute transportation that might be re-
quired in an emergency. The court found that the policy did not suf-
ficiently warn of non-coverage. In addition, the court pointed out
that the insurer instructed Steven to mail the policy to his benefici-
45. Id. at 363, 118 N.E.2d at 557.
46. Id. at 366, 118 N.E.2d at 559.
47. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
48. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
49. Id. at 866, 377 P.2d at 286, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 867, 377 P.2d at 287, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
ary before boarding the plane. Since the insurer furnished no dupli-
cate to Steven, he could not have reviewed the policy language prior
to taking the substitute charter flight.52
The next major case in the development of the doctrine is the
landmark duty-to-defend case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.53 Dr.
Gray was insured by the defendant under a comprehensive personal
liability endorsement. The policy contained typical defense language
and specifically excluded coverage for acts "caused intentionally by
... the insured."54 The underlying personal injury case against Dr.
Gray alleged that he had "wilfully, maliciously, brutally and inten-
tionally assaulted" the plaintiff. Dr. Gray claimed he acted in self-
defense.55
The court found that the insurer had the duty to defend Dr. Gray.
The court made the illogical finding that the policy's defense clause
was ambiguous and "that the insured would reasonably expect a de-
fense by the insurer in all personal injury actions against him." 56 In
fact if read reasonably, an insured would expect just the opposite.
The policy excluded coverage for intentional acts and reasonable
reading of the policy should have clearly negated the insured's expec-
tation of the insurer defending the suit.
It has been suggested that the court in Gray was mandating cover-
age for a defense because no such coverage was available in the mar-
ketplace and that the burden of defending the action was more
appropriately placed on the insurer than the insured.57 The more
plausible explanation is that if the plaintiff had pleaded a negligence
cause of action or later so amended his complaint (as allowed by Cali-
fornia law),58 the insurer would then have had to defend against the
suit.59
III. KEETON'S FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Probably the major impetus in moving the doctrine of reasonable
expectations beyond that of solely an interpretative rule was the 1970
law review article by Professor, now Judge, Keeton.60 Keeton
pointed out that a number of judicial doctrines employed to regulate
the adhesion contract could better be grouped under a heading of
52. Id. at 877, 377 P.2d at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
53. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). See Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (1967).
54. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 278, 419 P.2d at 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
57. See Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1981).
58. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 277, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
59. Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
60. See Keeton, supra note 29.
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"honoring reasonable expectations" and he formulated the doctrine
as follows: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provi-
sions would have negated those expectations." 61 Keeton also theo-
rized that the principle should incorporate the following propositions:
1) The language of the insurance policy should be interpreted as a
layman would read the policy;62
2) If the insured's expectations were objectively reasonable, those
expectations then should be protected even if a close and detailed
study of the policy by the insured would have defeated those ex-
pectations;63 and
3) If the policy language differed from "the reasonable expecta-
tions of a policyholder having an ordinary degree of familiarity
with the type of coverage involved,"64 ! the insurer could not rely on
such policy language unless the insurer had given adequate notice
to the insured prior to the selling of the policy.65
The most important aspect of Keeton's formulation was the recog-
nition that courts were applying the concept of reasonable expecta-
tions as more than an interpretive tool. The idea that the
enforcement of policy provisions might become discretionary or that
the courts would use the doctrine of reasonable expectations as an
unprincipled means of reaching decisions (as feared by some com-
mentators),66 was clearly not intended by Keeton. Keeton noted spe-
cifically that his formulation was not specific enough for courts in
deciding particular cases. 67 Keeton also limited the area of expecta-
tions of the insured:
[T]he illustrations we have examined here involve expectations treated by pol-
icy language and structure and by marketing' patterns and general practices.
These are expectations shared by many and based on matters emanating from
61. Id. at 967. Professor Young, in 1981, restated the doctrine as it had evolved: "If
the general design of a policy is in wide currency,' no provision in a policy of that de-
sign precludes a given claim of loss unless a representative buyer of like policies
would conclude that it does, upon a reasonably attentive reading of the policy in ques-
tion." Young, Insurance Policy Defenses: In Search of Restatement, 34 ARK. L. REV.
507, 510 (1981) (emphasis in original).
62. Keeton, supra note 29, at 967.
63. Id. at 968-69.
64. Id. at 968.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expec-
tation, 6 FORUM 116 (1971); Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectation, 6 FORUM 252 (1971).
67. Keeton, supra note 29, at 967.
a source relatively near the command center of the insurer's operational
structure. It seems both appropriate and likely that the expectations principle
identified here will be extended only to expectations of a somewhat common
rather than exceptional character .... 68
IV. THE MATURING OF THE DOCTRINE
The case of Herzog v. National American Insurance Co.,69 was de-
cided about the same time as the publication of the Keeton article.
The context of the case was a declaratory relief action in which the
issue raised was whether a homeowner's policy was to be considered
a motor vehicle liability policy, thus providing coverage for an acci-
dent occuring three to five miles away from the insured premises, or
strictly a homeowner's policy which limited coverage for vehicle-re-
lated accidents to those occurring on "the ways immediately adjoin-
ing" the insured premises. 70 The court noted that the phrase in
question, though somewhat imprecise, could still be reasonably
construed.
Rather than hold the imprecise language strictly against the in-
surer, thus perhaps finding in favor of coverage, the court looked at
the reasonable expectations of both the insured and the insurer. The
insurer's expectations were developed objectively by looking at the
information sought by the insurer on the application and the small
premium charge. From this, the court determined that the insurer
did not contemplate extended automobile coverage. 71 The court also
noted that customarily, automobile insurance was purchased by
homeowners and that the premiums, commensurate with the risk,
were much higher. As a result, the court found that the reasonable
expectations of the insured did not encompass the limited motor ve-
hicle coverage in a homeowner's policy being turned into a general
automobile liability policy.72 Thus, by seeking and determining the
reasonable expectations of both parties the court used the doctrine to
reject a concept that would have greatly expanded the policy limits
available to victims of automobile accidents.
The court, in Herzog, was not faced with an issue of non-available
coverage as it may have been in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.73 since
automobile insurance was readily available. It was not faced with
any evidence of any unfair marketing or claims practices on the part
of the insurer. The court correctly analyzed the case both from the
standpoint of the insurer and insured in general. The court denied
68. Id. at 973-74.
69. 2 Cal. 3d 192, 465 P.2d 841, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1970).
70. Id. at 196, 465 P.2d at 842, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
71. Id. at 197, 465 P.2d at 843, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
72. Id.
73. 65 Cal. 2d 253, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
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coverage rather than seeking to expand the policy in this one case to
provide a greater pool of insurance for this one accident and at the
same time, adding considerable expense to the insured public. This
could occur through increased homeowner insurance premiums, and
could possibly invite a rewrite of policy forms by insurers and a possi-
ble myriad of new litigation over the wording of the new language.
Following the Keeton article, the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions, advanced either as an interpretative tool or to avoid specific
policy provisions, began to appear with great frequency in reported
decisions7a and in law reviews. 75 An analysis of several of the impor-
tant cases since 1970 will illustrate the varied approaches used by the
courts as the doctrine received greater emphasis.
In determining the enforceability of a burglary policy that required
visible marks of forcible entry on the exterior of the building, the
Iowa Supreme Court in C & J Fertilizer, Inc., v. Allied Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,7 6 voided the restrictive definition on three grounds: reason-
able expectations, implied warranty and unconscionability. In
determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, the court
seemed to focus on both the subjective expectations of this particular
insured and the objective expectations of a reasonable insured. For
instance, the court zeroed in on the conversation between the insured
and the agent prior to purchase of the policy. The agent stated that
"there had to be visible evidence of burglary,"77 without any refer-
ence to the actual wording of the policy. It should be pointed out
that the agent's statement of the policy language, though incomplete,
was not incorrect. The insured could not recall reading the definition
of burglary after receiving the policy. 78
74. There are literally hundreds of reported cases that discuss the doctrine.
75. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 57; Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Sec-
ond Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976); Perlet, supra note 66; Squires, supra note 66; Young,
supra note 61; Young, Insurance Contract Interpretations: Issues and Trends, 1975 INS.
L.J. 71 (1975); Note, Reasonable Expectations: The Insurer's Dilemma, 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 853 (1975); Note, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 155 (1984); Note, Dobosz v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co.: Representations in Insurance Advertising Brochure as Part of the
Insurance Contract, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 969 (1984)'; Note, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire: A Comparative Analysis, 17 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 891 (1982); Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reason-
able Expectations in the Construction of Insuranc& Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175
(1982); Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Ap-
plied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603 (1980).
76. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
77. Id. at 171-73.
78. Id. at 172-73.
As to objective expectations, the court appears to have concen-
trated on the fact that the policy definition of burglary was more re-
strictive than either the legal or lay definition. 79 In addition, though
the court discussed this under the heading of unconscionability, the
court apparently felt that the restrictive policy definition of burglary
was not plain and conspicuous since it appeared in the definition sec-
tion of the policy and not in the exclusions section.8 0 It should be
noted that the court never found the provision to be ambiguous.
The court in C & J Fertilizer apparently felt that a burglary had
been sufficiently proven and that the definition of burglary, in the
absence of adequate notice to the insured prior to purchase of the
policy, was so overly restrictive as to negate a literal reading of the
provision. Unfortunately, the court never truly considered whether
the limitation was reasonable in terms of avoiding fraudulent
claims,81 thus benefitting all insureds as a class by lower premium
costs. In addition, the court never considered whether the insured's
expectations were those of a reasonable "policy holder having an or-
dinary degree of familiarity with"8 2 burglary coverage. In fact, such
definitional language was not uncommon in like policies.83
The C & J Fertilizer decision seemed to indicate that the Iowa
Supreme Court would readily refuse to enforce policy provisions
under the guise of reasonable expectations; however, such has not
been the case. In Chipokas v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,84 the issue
raised was whether Travelers had a duty to defend on a professional
liability policy issued to a lawyer sued for fraud where the policy spe-
cifically excluded fraudulent and dishonest acts, and the defense
clause in the policy provided:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy, the company
shall: (a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such act or omission
79. Id. at 176-77.
80. Id. at 179.
81. Two major costs of insurance are: (1) covered but exaggerated claims, and (2)
intentional losses by insureds. M. GREENE & J. TRIESCHMAN, RISK & INSURANCE 30
(6th ed. 1984); see also infra note 83.
82. Keeton, supra note 29, at 968.
83. See, e.g., Cochran v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 201 Neb. 631, 271 N.W.2d 331 (1978)
(upholding a theft exclusion for property in an unattended motor vehicle in a home-
owner's policy that required visible marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of the
vehicle) In an early work on insurance law, the authors state:
Obviously the danger that the burglary, robbery or theft will be committed
by an employee or even by the insured is great. In order to reduce this hazard
and avoid paying this type of claim, the policies often require that the feloni-
ous entry into the premises or into the safe must be by actual force and vio-
lence and that visible marks must be left upon the exterior of the premises or
safe. A provision of this nature is valid and in the absence of substantial com-
pliance therewith, the insured cannot recover.
W. VANCE & B. ANDERSON, VANCE ON INSURANCE § 199, at 1015 (3d ed. 1951) (footnote
omitted).
84. 267 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1978).
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and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this policy, even if
any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent .... 85
The court refused to apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations
because it found the language of the policy not to be misleading, im-
pliedly found the language to be unambiguous, and found no conduct
on the insurer's part which would have led the lawyer to believe he
might be defended.8 6 The court also refused to apply the faulty rea-
soning of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.8.7 In addition, the court was
undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the insured was a lawyer.88
The doctrine of reasonable expectations was misapplied by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Co.89 In
Smith, the decedent signed an application for life insurance and sub-
mitted the first month's premium to the agent. Because the dece-
dent's occupation was hazardous, the insurer was not willing to
insure the decedent with a policy that included accidental death ben-
efits and a waiver of premium for disability as contained in the origi-
nal application. Additionally, the insurer increased the original
premium by $4.57 per month.90 The decedent orally refused the
modified coverage and the additional premium charges. The evening
before Smith's death, the insurer, through its agent, informed Smith
that the company would not issue the policy and that the premium
would be refunded.91
The court found coverage on three grounds. First, the court found
85. Id. at 394 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 396. Note that the court did not use the word "misconduct."
87. Id. See also 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
88. In the later case of Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104
(Iowa 1981), the Iowa Supreme Court held that an insured driving a pickup from the
insured farm was not entitled to coverage under a farm policy that excluded motor ve-
hicles "while away from the insured premises or the ways immediately adjoining." Id.
at 107. Applying an objective standard, the court found that no reasonable insured
would have expected coverage. Id. at 114. Sandbulte seems to indicate that the doc-
trine is applicable only where:
1) an ordinary layperson would misunderstand! coverage, or
2) either of the following occurs:
a) the exclusion is either
"(1) bizarre and oppressive, (2) eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3)
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction," or
b) conduct attributable to the insurer creates a reasonable expectation of
coverage.
Id. at 112-13.
89. 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975). The decision is criticized
in Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations As Applied
to Insurance 3 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603, 614 (1980). !
90. 15 Cal. 3d at 114-15, 539 P.2d at 435-36, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
91. Id. at 115, 539 P.2d at 436, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
that because the receipt did not explain how or when the temporary
coverage would be terminated if the insurer rejected the applica-
tion,92 an ambiguity existed in the conditional receipt given to Smith
by the agent. The court's finding of an ambiguity was unreasonable
and probably represented no more than reliance on a covert judicial
tool. The insurance contract was judicially implied and was not ex-
pressly set forth by the terms of the conditional receipt. Thus, the
so-called ambiguity was not in the express terms of the receipt. The
court was obviously annoyed that such conditional receipts had not
been rewritten to recognize judicially implied temporary life insur-
ance. 93 In addition, earlier California cases have indicated that mere
notice of rejection is sufficient.94 In Smith, the decedent had re-
ceived actual notification that the insurer had rejected the insurance
and that the premium would be refunded.95
A second basis relied upon by the Smith court in granting coverage
was a finding of unconscionability. 96 Again, the court was in error.
The court found the retention of the premium for six days after the
notice of rejection to be unconscionable. The court reasoned that the
insured may have expected coverage until the premium was re-
funded.97 However, substantial evidence existed in the record to sup-
port the trial court's finding that Smith had been informed of the
rejection 98 and that his premium was being refunded.99 Thus, there
was no reasonable basis for Smith to believe that he was still insured.
The six-day retention of the premiums certainly does not rise to a
level of oppressiveness that would justify a finding of substantive un-
conscionability.10 0 Again, like the ambiguity argument, unconsciona-
bility was used in this decision as a covert judicial tool to avoid
discussing the real reason for the decision. /
Third, the court in Smith stated that the reasonable expectations
of coverage by the insured, which were created by the application
and the payment of the premium, would continue until the insured
received the refund of the premium.' 0L Nothing in the case indicates
that Smith had any such expectations. In fact, the reasonable lay
92. Id. at 120-21, 539 P.2d at 440-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57.
93. Id. at 121-25, 539 P.2d at 440-43, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 656-59.
94. Id. at 127-28, 539 P.2d at 444-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61 (Clark, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 115, 539 P.2d at 436, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
96. Id. at 124-25, 539 P.2d at 443, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 126, 539 P.2d at 444, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
99. Id. at 115, 539 P.2d at 436, 123 Cal Rptr. at 652.
100. See Note, Termination of Temporary Insurance Coverage, Created by Applica-
tion and Payment of Premium, Requires Both Actual Notice of Rejection to Applicant
and Refund of Premium Paid, 64 GEO. L.J. 1199 (1976). Cf Abraham, supra note 57,
at 1161-62, where the author illustrates that retroactive coverage may prove to be
illusory.
101. 15 Cal. 3d at 126, 539 P.2d at 444, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
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person would have no such expectations because prior to Smith, the
case law in California did not require such a refund for
cancellation.102
The real reasons for the Smith decision appear to be twofold.
First, the court desired to redistribute the wealth (paying the widow).
Second, the court desired to judicially regulate the rejection practices
of the life insurance industry.
In another case, Karol v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,103 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court applied the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, rather than possible reformation, 104 to ensure that the
insured received the policy protection thlat he and the agent intended
to procure. Karol was a lawyer turned , professional film-maker. On
several past film projects, Karol had procured insurance from the
New Hampshire Insurance Company. In 1977, Karol asked his agent
for an all-risk, broad form coverage. The agent specifically requested
from New Hampshire a policy to cover film while in transit and
while in laboratories.105 An internal' memorandum of the New
Hampshire Insurance Company indicated that the transportation-
type policy should be written. The po!licy actually issued excluded
coverage while the film was being processed,106 the very event which
caused the claim.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found there to be expectation
of coverage because of the parties' prior dealings. Additionally, the
exclusion relied upon was buried in the exclusion section of the pol-
icy following what the court described as an "Armageddon" clause
which, among other things, excluded ,war, rebellion, and nuclear
fission. 07
The Karol court could have used a more direct approach by finding
that the questioned exclusion in the issued policy was not what was
requested or intended by the parties. The court could have also
102. Id. at 127-29, 539 P.2d at 444-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See also Koorstad v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 257 Cal. App. 2d 399, 64 Cal. Rptr. 882
(1967) (termination not effective until notice of rejection given to the prospective
insured).
103. 120 N.H. 287, 414 A.2d 939 (1980).
104. Reformation of an insurance contract may be available as a result of mutual
mistake, or unilateral mistake on the part of the insured when combined with the in-
surer's fraud or unconscionable conduct. A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES
§ 9.28 (1982).
105. 120 N.H. at 288-89, 414 A.2d at 940.
106. Id. at 289, 414 A.2d at 940-41.
107. Id. at 290, 414 A.2d at 941.
found that the exclusion effectively emasculated a dominant purpose
of the transaction.
A 1982 California case, Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta,08 illus-
trates the covert use that may be made of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. Pisciotta was in a speedboat accident in which his step-
son was injured. Reserve, the liability insurer of the speedboat, filed
a declaratory relief action claiming that it provided no coverage be-
cause of a family exclusion provision that excluded coverage for
"bodily injury to the insured or to any member of the family of the
insured residing in the same household as the insured."109 The fam-
ily exclusion was authorized by the California Insurance Codel10 and
had recently been upheld by the California Supreme Court.ll In or-
der to find coverage, the court determined that the word "family"
was ambiguous and then strictly construed the word against the in-
surer. A more reasonable approach would have been to interpret the
language of the policy as it would be understood by the ordinary rea-
sonable consumer of that type of insurance. An ordinary reasonable
consumer of such insurance would believe that a stepson living in the
home with the insured stepfather was a member of the stepfather's
family. If the stepson were seeking coverage, the court would proba-
bly find him an insured if the definition of insured were the same as
that used in the family exclusion by strictly construing any perceived
ambiguity against the insurer. By eliminating the ambiguity rules
and by construing the language pursuant to that of the ordinary rea-
sonable insurance consumer of that type of insurance, the result
would be one of consistency in interpreting the term "family."112
The real basis for the court's finding that the stepson was not ex-
cluded from coverage appears to be based on two principles. First,
108. 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d 764, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1982).
109. Id. at 807, 640 P.2d at 767, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (footnote omitted).
110. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1(c) (West Supp. 1985).
111. 29 Cal. 3d 383, 628 P.2d 1, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1981). Compare State Farm Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984) (family exclusion in home-
owner's policy not against public policy) with Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wis-
comb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982) (family exclusion in automobile policy
violates public policy). See also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont.
1983), where the court held that because Montana did not recognize parental immunity
for torts to children, the family exclusion in a homeowners policy violated the reason-
able expectations of the insured. The reasoning of the court is highly suspect because
the issue of parental immunity was left unresolved and the policy specifically con-
tained the family exclusion. It would appear that the objective reasonable expecta-
tions of the average purchaser of homeowner's insurance would have been the exact
opposite of the court's finding. If the court had found that no parental immunity ex-
isted, then the issue of reasonable expectations would have been more properly
presented.
112. Cf State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984)
(court upheld a family exclusion where the policy contained a more specific definition
of insured).
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the court apparently disliked the legislatively-approved family exclu-
sion.1 1 3 Second, the court desired to make the insurance proceeds
available to the injured stepson (wealth-redistribution).
A classic case for the application of the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations was Dobosz v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.114 The in-
sured purchased a homeowner's policy entitled "'All-Risk' Special
Policy." The insured then suffered water damage when water leaked
into his basement. State Farm denied coverage because the policy
specifically excluded such water damage.1' 5
The policy was sold to Dobosz by a State Farm agent who described
the "All-Risk" policy as the "Cadillac of the line." The agent gave
Dobosz a brochure and told him that the brochure would explain
what the policy covered. Dobosz relied upon the brochure and
purchased the "All-Risk" policy.116
The brochure indicated that the "All-Risk" policy added coverages
not contained in the other homeowner policies available through
State Farm. In addition, under the coverages enumerated as part of
the "All-Risk" policy, a picture with the caption "Water Damage" ap-
peared. The picture portrayed an open window with rain falling
through it, forming a puddle of water.117 The picture apparently did
not misrepresent the specific policy coverage. The brochure, in small
print at the bottom, contained a disclaimer providing that the
brochure only generally described the coverages and that coverages
were subject to the specific policy's exclusions.118
The Illinois court found coverage on three theories. First, the
court held that the brochure became part of the insurance contract
and thus created an ambiguity.11 9 Second, the court found coverage
by estoppel.x20 Third, the court, though appearing to confuse estop-
113. 30 Cal. 3d at 807, 640 P.2d at 767, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
114. 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611 (1983).
115. Id at 676, 458 N.E.2d at 612. This exclusion was delineated in the policy itself,
but it was not delineated in the brochure sent to Dobosz.
116. Id at 677, 458 N.E.2d at 612-13.
117. Id. at 677, 458 N.E.2d at 613.
118. "This brochure contains only a general description of coverages and is not a
statement of contract. All coverages are subject to the exclusions and conditions in the
policy itself." Id.
119. "[Ihe clear implication of State Farm's advertising brochure differs from the
exclusionary provisions of the policy issued to plaintiff." Id. at 679-80, 458 N.E.2d at
614-15.
120. "An insurer may be estopped to rely on an exclusionary clause in the insur-
ance policy where descriptive brochures or solicitation materials distributed by the in-
surer misrepresent coverage." Id at 680, 459 N.E.2d at 615.
pel with reasonable expectations, found that the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured favored coverage. 121
Rather than straining the law of contracts and misapplying the es-
toppel theory, a better approach for the court would have been a de-
cision finding that under all of the circumstances, a reasonable
consumer of this type of policy would have expectations of coverage.
These circumstances included the agent's refusal to explain the cov-
erages, the agent's assertion that the brochure would explain the pol-
icy, the depiction of water damage in the brochure, the inadequate
small print disclaimer containing the exclusions, the agent's referral
to the policy as an "'All-Risk' Special Policy," and the fact that the
technical meaning of an "all-risk" policy is not the same interpreta-
tion as that of a layperson.122
V. A JUDICIAL TOOL To CREATE COVERAGE?
The doctrine of reasonable expectations clearly has not been ap-
plied in a one-sided manner in order to find coverage. The New
Jersey Supreme Court applied the doctrine to deny excess coverage
to a vehicle not listed under a family automobile policy. 1 23 The un-
listed vehicle was regularly used by the named insured for personal
business although title had been transferred to the named insured's
business entity.124
Other cases have used the doctrine to avoid the stacking of under-
insured coverages,125 and uninsured motorist coverages, 126 to deny a
claim that an agent's statement that the insured had full coverage
meant there were no limitations on coverage,127 and, in a state which
allows stacking of uninsured motorist benefits, to avoid a totally un-
realistic extension of the stacking precedents.128
On the other hand, some courts have applied the reasonable expec-
121. Id.
122. See Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils
for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 392 (1985).
123. DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 79 N.J. 257, 398 A.2d 1274 (1979).
124. Id. at 265, 398 A.2d at 1278.
125. See Votedian v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 330 Pa. Super. 13,
478 A.2d 1324 (1984). Cf Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925
(Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (court refused to stack uninsured and underinsured coverages).
126. See Inter-Insurance Exchange v. State Farm Ins. Co., 113 Ill. App. 3d 157, 446
N.E.2d 1224 (1983). Compare Deyarmond v. Community Serv. Ins. Co., 132 Mich. App.
191, 347 N.W.2d 201 (1984) and Konopelski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 187 N.J.
Super. 478, 455 A.2d 516 (1982) (both cases disallowed stacking of liability limits). See
also Evenchik v. State Farm Ins. Co., 139 Ariz. 453, 679 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1984); Hallo-
well v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
127. See State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139
(1984).
128. Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1976) (attempt to stack
coverage on 1969 vehicles in a fleet policy).
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tations doctrine in a more questionable manner, raising the issue of
whether the doctrine was being applied in a principled manner or be-
ing employed as a covert method to hide the true reasoning behind
the decision. Examples are application of the doctrine to avoid the
clear legal malpractice of the insured's lawyer,129 applying the doc-
trine to avoid the apparent negligence of an agent in failing to insure
an electrician for completed operations, 130 applying the doctrine to
allow the innocent spouse to recover under a fire insurance policy
when her husband was guilty of arson,131 and applying the doctrine
to insurance policies that are probably not true adhesion contracts. 132
In addition, there continue to be cases that strain hard-to-create am-
biguities in order to find coverage.133
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS
In fleshing out the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the cases
seem to be moving toward rules' 3 4 which may be summarized as
follows:
129. See Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 133 Ariz. 139, 650 P.2d 441 (1982);
Galinko v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 432 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
130. Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636, 365 A.2d 744 (1976).
131. Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
132. See, e.g., Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 747 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1984); Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186
N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982).
133. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.1 Reno's Executive Air, Inc., 682 P.2d
1380 (Nev. 1980); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Chubb Group, 194 N.J. Super. 69, 476
A.2d 290 (1984).
134. See A. WINDT, supra note 104, where the author postulates that the formula-
tion of the reasonable expectations rule should be as follows:
1. The policy is in the nature of an adhesion contract.
2. The enforcement of the provision would defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of the great majority of policyhdlders to whose claims the provi-
sion would be relevant.
3. The provision was not explained to the insured when he or she
purchased the policy.
4. The provision is either unclear and inconspicuous, needlessly misleading
and obscure, or unfair, in that either eviscerates any nonstandard terms
explicitly agreed to or eliminates the dominant purpose of the
transaction.
Id. § 6.03, at 235-37 (footnotes omitted).
See also Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expecta-
tions in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, where the
author proposes that the insurer be required to prove that the insurance provision was
specifically explained to the insured. The author relied heavily on Hionis v. Northern
Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Pa. Super. 511, 327 A.2d 363 (1974), which held that the insurer must
prove that the insured was not only aware of the exclusion, but also that the insured
understood the exclusion. Hionis was subsequently overruled in Standard Venetian
Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983). Cf Collister
1) The doctrine should only apply to contracts of insurance that
are true contracts of adhesion;135
2) In cases of ambiguity in the policy language, the policy will be
interpreted in light of the objective reasonable expectations of
the average insured;13 6
3) Regardless of any ambiguity in the language of the insurance
policy, the objective reasonable expectations of the average in-
sured will be applied where the insured did not receive full
and adequate notice of the provision in question, and (a) the
policy provision in question is unusual and unexpected,137 or
(b) the policy provision effectively emasculates the apparent
coverage;138
4) Where, prior to contracting for the insurance, some activity on
the part of the insurer, or activity which can be reasonably at-
v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089
(1979).
135. See, e.g., Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal. 3d 426, 682 P.2d 1100, 204 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1984) (insurance contract negotiated by California Hospital Association not adhe-
sive); Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (em-
ployee group health policy not adhesive since employer negotiated terms); cf Royal
Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
136. See, e.g., Davenport Peters Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 286 (D.
Mass. 1980); Western Exterminating Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 479 A.2d
872 (D.C. 1984); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Rod-
man v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1973); Baybutt Constr.
Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914 (Me. 1983); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Perlman, 187 N.J. Super. 499, 455 A.2d 527 (1983). A number of cases apply a subjec-
tive standard erroneously in interpreting the policy language. Some of the cases apply-
ing a subjective standard also involve conduct attributable to the insurer. See, e.g., C &
J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); cf Herzog v. Na-
tional Am. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 192, 465 P.2d 841, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1970).
137. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 66 Cal. App. 3d 464, 136 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1977); Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984) (re-
newal policy allowed insurer to terminate duty to defend by tender of policy limits;
court refused enforcement of this major change without specific notice to insured).
138. See, e.g., Huffman v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 337 Pa. Super. 274, 486 A.2d
1330 (1985). A group hospitalization policy provided coverage only if a hospital ex-
tended care facility was a "hospital." The policy required a "hospital" to provide facili-
ties for diagnosis and major surgery, and excluded nursing homes, convalescent homes
and similar facilities from the definition of "hospital." The court held for the insured
because, in part, a reasonable insured would expect coverage while in a hospital de-
partment, even though the department itself might not meet the policy's definition of
"hospital." Id. at 1337, 486 A.2d at 1335. See also Entron, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co.,
749 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1984); Kates v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 477
(D. Mass. 1981); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1979);
Cody v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 387 Mass. 142, 439 N.E.2d 234 (1982) (court can
limit enforcement of ambiguous insurance contracts where (1) company's marketing
techniques make contract misleading, and (2) contract as a whole is without substan-
tial economic value); Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d
413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (court upheld a care, custody, and control exclusion in a con-
tractor's comprehensive liability policy as serving, rather than undermining, the domi-
nant purpose of the policy - insuring against liability to third parties); Kievit v. Loyal
Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
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tributed to the insurer, has created an objective impression of
coverage as to a reasonable insured;13 9 and
5) Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer
prior to contracting for the insurance has caused this particular
insured to reasonably believe that he has coverage, although
such coverage is denied by the policy.140
A. Applies Only To Adhesion Contracts
Because the doctrine of reasonable expectations has its genesis in
the desire of the courts to regulate adhesion contracts--contracts of-
fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis-the doctrine should have no ap-
plication in interpreting policies of I insurance that have been
negotiated. As to these negotiated policies, the ordinary rules of con-
tract law provide sufficient protection to both parties.14 1
Only a small percentage of insurance! contracts are, in fact, negoti-
ated or can be negotiated due to the insurer's economic power and
the lack thereof on the part of most insureds. Although such insur-
ance contracts may be reflected by standardized forms, insureds of
sufficient economic power - generally large commercial, govern-
mental, or special groups - may have access not only to in-house ex-
pertise, but also to attorneys and insurance consultants.142
B. As An Interpretative Tool
The majority of courts have restricted the application of the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations to onlythose cases where an ambigu-
ity in the policy language exists.143 This restriction is unfortunate
139. See, e.g., Stewart-Smith Haidinger, Inc; v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 682 P.2d 1108
(Alaska 1984); INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975); Dobosz v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611 (1983); Karol v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 287, 414 A.2d 939 (1980); Bierer v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 314 Pa. Super. 397, 461 A.2d 216 (1983); cf. Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (court indicated that the insured's
knowledge is relevant in determining objective reasonable expectations).
140. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. AlliedMut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975); Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980 (1980).
141. See supra note 135.
142. See supra note 135.
143. See, e.g., Davenport Peters Co. v. Royal' Globe Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 286 (D.
Mass. 1980); cf. Evenchik v. State Farm Ins. Co., 139 Ariz. 453, 679 P.2d 99 (1984); West-
ern Exterminating Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 479 A.2d 872 (D.C. 1984);
Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 67 Hawaii 203, 684 P.2d 960 (1984); Twin City
Hide v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 358 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1984) (where the insurance con-
tract in question was found ambiguous); Croteau v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 123
and seems to be based upon two notions: first, an over-reliance on
the classical rules of freedom of contract,144 and second, a probable
fear of unprincipled application.145 The answer to the first notion is
simple - the insurance policy does not contain bargained-for terms.
The second notion can only be overcome by requiring a principled ap-
proach with discrete rules of application.146
In jurisdictions which have adopted the interpretative doctrine,
opinions either confuse or combine the reasonable expectations inter-
pretation approach with other rules of construction, such as constru-
ing ambiguities strictly against the insurer. This indicates a failure of
these courts to understand that by applying the interpretative rule of
reasonable expectations, the other ambiguity construction rules be-
come inapplicable.
It might be advisable for the courts to adopt the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine as the primary rule of insurance contract interpreta-
tion and to discard the ambiguity rules altogether.147 This would give
clear notice to the insurance industry that an entire policy would be
read based upon the objective reasonable expectations of the average
consumer of that type of policy. Although many courts today proba-
bly interpret policies in this way, it appears unrealistic to expect the
courts to abandon their past formulations of insurance policy con-
struction in the near future.
By limiting the reasonable expectations doctrine as an interpreta-
tive tool only to be used in cases of perceived ambiguity in the policy
language, courts must resort to the much criticized covert decisional
methods. The reasonable expectations doctrine in its expanded form,
applied in a principled manner, provides a more supportable deci-
sional answer.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations, when used in the face of
contrary policy language should not be used indiscriminately, which
would lead to unprincipled uses for covert purposes. Rather, discrim-
inate use of the doctrine can enhance the acceptability of the doctrine
and the authority of the cases decided on that basis. The doctrine
should not be used covertly for wealth-spreading purposes 148 or for
mandating insurance coverage which is not provided in the market-
place.149 These are areas of concern which are better left either to
N.H. 317, 461 A.2d 111 (1983); Storms v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 118 N.H.
427, 388 A.2d 578 (1978).
144. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 384-95.
145. Cf Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979); Standard
Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983).
146. See Abraham, supra note 57, at 1197-98.
147. See Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 594, 388 A.2d 1346, 1353
(1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
148. Cf Abraham, supra note 57, at 1193-95.
149. For examples of courts mandating coverage, see Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
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legislative action or to the private marketplace.
C. The Unusual Or Emasculating Provision
The objective reasonable buyer of a particular type of insurance
policy usually will be presumed to have had past dealings with insur-
ance policies involving similar risks. Thus, the reasonable insured
will come into the transaction with certain preconceived notions of
insurance coverage. The insurer, as the marketer of the policy,
should know, and therefore can be fairly charged with, this knowl-
edge. Thus, when an insurer makes a major change in its policy
which decreases coverage 5 0 or deviates from the provisions of the
standard policies, the insurer should bear the burden of giving ade-
quate notice of this deviation or change to the insured prior to the
time the insurance is purchased.151 Certain provisions in a policy,
when applied to a particular insurance transaction, may result in se-
riously reducing the benefits in the policy, sometimes to the point
that the protection provided is not economic from the standpoint of
the insured. Such policy provisions cannot be adequately understood
in the abstract. Due to the superior knowledge of the insurer, it
seems fair that the insurer should bear the burden of either giving
adequate notice to the insured or losing the benefits of the provision
that the insurer drafted.152
A recent example of a policy provision that emasculated part of the
coverage can be found in Kates v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.'5 3 The case involved a group policy purchased through the in-
sured's workplace which provided for lifetime disability benefits.
The policy also contained a clearly worded coordination-of-benefits
clause for social security and workers' compensation benefits. When
Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (duty to defend case); Gyler v. Mission
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 216, 514 P.2d 1219, 110 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1973) (providing tail coverage
in professional liability cases); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d
1002 (Miss. 1984) (stacking of uninsured motorist limits).
150. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 68 Cal. App. 3d 464, 136 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1977)
(where amendment was added without request or explanation and contrary to previ-
ous coverage).
151. See Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984).
152. Cf Abraham, supra note 57, at 1169-75.
153. 509 F. Supp. 477 (D. Mass. 1981). See also Cody v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 387 Mass. 142, 439 N.E.2d 234 (1982), which interprets Kates as indicating that mar-
keting techniques can make an unambiguous insurance contract misleading. Cody up-
holds a coordination-of-benefits clause. Cody also indicates, contrary to Kates, that the
court should determine whether the whole contract, rather than a particular provision,
has substantial economic value to the insured. Id. at 150-51, 439 N.E.2d at 239-40.
this clause was applied to the insured, who received a disabling job-
related injury, it reduced his disability benefits to zero after six
months. In upholding the social security part of the coordination
clause but denying enforceability of the workers' compensation part
of the clause, Judge Keeton found no ambiguity in the literal terms
of the document. However, he did find what he termed to be an "am-
biguity in communication" 5 4 which caused the policy to become mis-
leading. Due to the technical nature of the operation of such a
clause, the true effect of the coordination-of-benefits clause as to
workers' compensation benefits could not be understood by an in-
sured unless the insured had sufficient information to know how
such a clause would operate. Thus, the court found that the lifetime
coverage for on-the-job injuries was of "no substantial value to the
plaintiff or other employees of the participating companies similarly
situated."155
The essence of Kates is that it would be unfair to enforce the coor-
dination-of-benefits clause as to workers' compensation benefits in a
claim arising from job-related injuries resulting in disability. Because
the insurance was sold to the insured through his employment, it
would be objectively reasonable for the insured to believe that the
promised disability benefits would be available in the event of a job-
related injury; such belief on the part of the insured would be a ma-
jor consideration in the initial purchase of the policy. As to the coor-
dination of social security benefits, such clauses are not unusual, and
the clause would apply across the board to both job-related and non-
job-related injuries; thus, the social security coordination provision
was neutral. Neither the selling of the policy through the place of
employment nor any other activity of the insured created any expec-
tations of the insured different from the explicit terms of the social
security coordination-of-benefits provision.
Clauses similar to the coordination-of-benefits clause in Kates are
common, and generally will not emasculate the coverage. In fact, co-
ordination-of-benefits provisions have distinctive value in the vast
majority of cases.'5 6 Such clauses result in lower overall claim costs,
as well as reduced premium costs. Additionally, such clauses reduce
the possibility of an insured profiting from the insured incident,
thereby discouraging claims of doubtful validity. These clauses also
increase the insured's incentive to make a timely claim on those poli-
cies that are claims time-related, such as disability and hospitalization
154. Kates, 509 F. Supp. at 485.
155. Id. at 492.
156. See, e.g., Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Hendrix, 385 So. 2d 63
(Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (coordination-of-benefits clause prevents double recovery, and in-
sured could have no reasonable expectation of a double recovery); Cody v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 387 Mass. 142, 439 N.E.2d 234 (1982).
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policies. Although generally valid, clauses such as the workers' com-
pensation coordination-of-benefits clause in Kates may result in little
or no benefits to the insured. In particular insurance transactions,
the marketing techniques or other insurer conduct may result in the
unenforceability of an unambiguous provision because the activities
of the insurer may have created objectively reasonable expectations
of coverage in the insured - expectations which in all fairness
should be honored.
Judicially mandating disclosure of the contents of insurance poli-
cies is a complex problem. Although it may appear to be the simple
answer to a court faced with a single case, any such answer may be
erroneous if studied in depth. The complications of such a solution
include the increased administrative burden, the increased costs to
policyholders, the extent to which the prospective insured can under-
stand the information, and the ability of the marketing process to ec-
onomically conform. Additionally, insurers may decide that the cost
and marketing disadvantages of compliance outweigh the potential
legal liability.157
D. Insurer Conduct
Cases decided on the basis of the reasonable expectations doctrine
which involve conduct of the insurer, apart from the wording of the
policy, often also involve discussions of the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel.158 Cases limited to the wording of the policy involve discus-
sions of unconscionability and reasonable expectations.1 59 Those
cases involving both insurer conduct and the wording of the policy
may speak in terms of all three: reasonable expectations, unconscion-
ability and equitable estoppel.160 Attempting to distinguish between
reasonable expectations, estoppel, and unconscionability can be diffi-
cult because the doctrine of reasonable expectations, with its equity
origins, often overlaps with the other two.
Equitable estoppel normally requires 'a finding of misrepresenta-
tion, either active or passive.' 6 ' The reasonable expectations doc-
157. For a careful analysis of mandated disclosure, see Abraham, supra note 57, at
1169-75.
158. See, e.g., Bouchard v. Travelers Indem. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 122, 253 A.2d 497
(1969).
159. See, e.g., Evans v. National Life Accident Ins. Co., 467 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984).
160. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975).
161. See Abraham, supra note 57, at 1178-79.
trine, as applied by the courts, focuses more on the insured's view of
the transaction rather than on the insurer's conduct. Many courts re-
fuse to apply estoppel to expand coverage beyond the stated terms of
the policy.162 By applying the reasonable expectations doctrine, the
limitations of the estoppel doctrine can be avoided without doing the
estoppel doctrine injustice. Application of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine will produce a fair result.
In addition, because the expectations doctrine focuses on the in-
sured's view, the doctrine transfers to the insurer the problem of lack
of information about the specific terms of the policy. This is a fair
transfer of such a burden because it is the insurer who is most re-
sponsible for lack of information and has the best ability to rectify
the situation. Perhaps better information or notice cannot be pro-
vided economically or feasibly by the insurers. Even so, it is still fair
to place the burden on the insurer, who can then pass on the eco-
nomic costs to the whole pool of insureds as a method of risk-
distribution.
Once beyond the question of the objective reasonable expectation
of coverage, the question of the subjective expectation of a particular
insured must be considered. The analysis of the latter is similar to
that of equitable estoppel, with two exceptions. First, no actual find-
ing of a misrepresentation, either active or passive, on the part of the
insurer is required. Second, the insured need not prove reliance.
However, the differences here are not as great as they may seem.
First, reliance and the reasonableness of the insured's expectations
are very similar concepts, and the proofs may not significantly differ.
Second, although the insurer's conduct may not rise to a level of mis-
representation as such, the insurer will be responsible for either
some misinformation or lack of information which directly causes
reasonable expectation of coverage by the insured.163
The doctrine of unconscionability, on the other hand, requires a
finding of substantive oppressiveness in a particular provision. Most
insurance provisions will not reach this level. As a result, the uncon-
scionability doctrine has not had a major effect on the courts.164 Be-
cause the unconscionability doctrine focuses on the fairness of the
policy provision, the insurer can introduce evidence of the commer-
cial reasonableness of the provision.16 5 Such evidence might not
162. See, e.g., Twin City Hide v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 358 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984).
163. See Abraham, supra note 57, at 1179-85.
164. See Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Completed or Revolution Be-
gun, 1978 INs. L.J. 573, 577 n.14 (1978). See also Evans v. National Life Accident Ins.
Co., 467 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
165. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1978), which provides: "When it is claimed or appears to
the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
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enter into the consideration of whether the expectations of the in-
sured were reasonable. In addition, unconscionability does not turn
on the issue of the insured's expectatiors; thus, a provision could be
declared unconscionable even though the provision was in accord
with the insured's expectations. 166
VII. APPLYING THE RULES
In applying these judicial rules in a manner which gives some hope
of predictability, the courts must be more principled in their ap-
proach and more careful in drafting opinions in this area. The courts
need to be vigorous in their findings of: reasonableness and need to
carefully recite the factual basis upon which they rely in determining
the standard of the reasonable expectations of the average insured.
In using an objective standard, the courts should point out that the
insured's own expectations are not controlling, but merely evidence
on this issue. In fact, the insured's expectations167 may often be sus-
pect, especially if supportable only by state of mind evidence.
The courts should also abandon the term "average insured" and fo-
cus rather on the reasonable expectations of the average consumer of
the type of insurance in question. As an example, lawyers should be
held to a higher standard in purchasing 'a legal malpractice policyl6S
than that of the average insured in some general market, such as the
purchaser of an automobile policy.
Because of the large number of reported opinions in this area, pre-
cision in detailing the factual undergirdings of the reported decisions
will result in a further refinement of the':often cautiously stated rules
and in the development of new rules. As the rules become further
developed and as usable factual patterns appear in the opinions ac-
companying such rules, those courts that: have limited the reasonable
expectations doctrine to be used only as an interpretative tool will be
more prone to adopt the doctrine in its expanded form. Such devel-
opment and refinement of the doctrine will hopefully lead to less
covert decision-making in the area of insurance law. The reported
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to preseAt evidence as to its commercial set-
ting, purpose and effect to aid the court in makingthe determination."
166. Cf Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-302(1)
(1978).
167. FED. R. EVID. § 402. See also Huffman, supzra note 144.
168. See, e.g., Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413,
425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (analysis of general contractor's insurance knowledge).
opinions will then provide greater predictability for lawyers and pro-
vide trial judges with reported opinions more understandable and of
greater precedential value.
